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In recent years, social media has increasingly become an important platform for competitive campaigns,
especially during political elections. It remains elusive how public discourse is driven by the intricate interplay
between identity politics and dueling campaign efforts. Here we show that the scope of identity with which
people feel resonated is key determinant of socio-cognitive biases in forming polarized and segregated network
structure, also known as echo chambers. We also find that winning majority support in public discourse is
determined not solely by whose voice is louder but also more subtly by the divergence of ideological positioning
between opposing campaigns. Further integrating our mechanistic model with the Twitter discourse data from
the presidential debate in the 2016 election reveals the combined effects of absorbing wavering undecided
individuals and increasing campaign effort on the unprecedented rise and fall of support rates to respective
presidential candidates.
Introduction
It has been long understood that people are more likely to ac-
cept the claim that is coherent with their own belief systems [1].
This trend originates from an interesting psychological effect:
confirmation bias, or selective exposure [2, 3]. These socio-
cognitive biases often lead to the emergence of polarized ho-
mogenous clusters in many controversial events, also known as
the echo chambers [4]. Echo chamber effects make people ig-
nore the voices they disagree with, continuously reinforce their
own beliefs and confine them within one cluster[5]. Decades
later, echo chamber effects show more powerful strength than
ever, particularly in light of the extensive studies and discus-
sions on 2016 US presidential election, which is actually a mi-
crocosm of the political polarization nowadays. As Chris An-
derson stated on TED Dialogue: “America is divided” and “The
division is getting worse” [6]. How could we create a healthier
environment for sufficient social discussions when echo cham-
ber effects are inevitable? Can public opinions be manipulated
to some extent? If so, how could media and society make pos-
itive influence on public discourse and further build bridges in
a polarized reality?
To answer these largely unknown questions, we need to un-
derstand the individual cognitive process with respect to the
public discourse and examine how echo chambers make in-
fluence on opinion evolutions in the information age. Dozens
of recent works reveal that in modern society, the way of in-
formation consumption and diffusion has radically changed
along with the rapid development of large-scale social networks
[7, 8]. The active online social networks as well as their in-
teractions with news portals make information spread faster,
wider and more effectively [9, 10]. More importantly, social
network users are no longer just passive recipients of informa-
tion, but also content creators and information disseminators as
they could share their own opinions [11]. These changes have a
substantial impact on public discourse and opinion formation:
individuals have direct chances to find evidence that supports
their existing ideas and follow those people who hold similar
viewpoints [12, 13]. The widely used recommendation algo-
rithms, somehow the amplifier of socio-cognitive biases, have
even accelerated this selective process [14, 15].
In recent years, the ubiquitous echo chamber phenomena
on social networks has aroused wide concern in diverse fields
[16, 17, 18]. Sociologists and political scientists are concerned
about the crisis of democracy and social polarization caused
by politically motivated selective exposure [19]. Twitter data
shows that political user groups are more likely to retweet users
belonging to their own group while supporters of one party
rarely interacts with rival party supporters [20, 21]. Opinion-
based confirmation bias in rumor spreading also attracts much
attention in network science and data science [22, 23, 24, 25].
A variety of empirical studies focus on understanding social
network users’ content consumption patterns in the age of mis-
information [26, 27, 28, 29]. A recent investigation using big
data on Twitter finds that it is because humans are more likely
to spread fake news, not robots, that makes false news spread
more than the truth [30]. Specifically, echo chamber effects
strongly reinforce rumor spreading processes and intensify seg-
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Figure 1: Echo chamber phenomena in social media Twitter. Shown are the formation and evolution of echo chambers in
retweet networks regarding (A) the first presidential debate in 2016 US presidential election and (B) the 2016 US vice-presidential
debate. In each subfigure, the nodes represent users, the edges indicate the retweeting relationships while the size of nodes and
the shade of colors reflect the number of being retweeted. In (A), the red nodes indicate individuals who tend to support Donald
Trump while blue ones Hillary Clinton supporters. The yellow cluster shows the existence of undecided individuals who may
hold neutral or wavering opinions. The dataset begins from Sep. 26, 17 : 45, and the final graph includes 54840 edges and 25375
nodes. In (B), the networks are divided into two polarized echo chambers: the red cluster (Mike Pence supporters) and the blue
cluster (Tim Kaine supporters). Different from the first presidential debate, there are very few undecided individuals. The dataset
starts from Oct. 4, 15 : 40 and the final graph includes 55008 edges and 24811 nodes.
regation of rumor cluster and anti-rumor cluster [31].
Despite the progress, very few theoretical frameworks have
been proposed to reveal socio-cognitive processes behind real
data [32, 33]. Notably, the underlying dynamical mecha-
nisms that how public discourse is driven by the interaction
between identity politics and campaign efforts are far from
being fully understood. To this end, we develop an agent-
based model which explicitly incorporate the socio-cognitive
biases to study the detailed impacts of echo chambers on pub-
lic discourse. First, we show the emergence of echo chamber
phenomena in retweet networks of two typical Twitter events
[34]. Our model successfully reproduces the observed cluster-
ing phenomena and suggests that the emerging polarized and
segregated network structure is largely determined by the re-
lationship between degree of ideological difference of cam-
paign viewpoints and the scope of identity with which people
feel resonated (“open-mindedness”). Second, we quantify and
explore how confirmation bias (reinforcing opinion resonance
via peer influence and campaign influence) and selection bias
(avoiding opinion dissonance via network rewiring), which has
been proved to be the driving factors of forming echo chambers
[31, 35], influence the coevolutionary dynamics of opinion for-
mation and network structure. Further, we find that winning
majority support in campaign competition is determined not
solely by relative campaign effort (whose voice is louder) but
also more subtly by the divergence of ideological positioning
between opposing campaigns. Finally, we conduct model-data
integration of the 2016 US presidential election, within which
our mechanistic model can reproduce the entire opinion evo-
lution processes obtained by Twitter discourse data, providing
profound insights into the campaign for election. Our findings
offer a lens for understanding the public discourse results on
large-scale social networks through individual cognitive pro-
cesses, which suggests direct points on possible solutions for
the serious social polarization issue from both individual and
social levels. Our work also paves ways for making positive in-
fluence on public discourse that may help advance many chal-
lenging social issues, such as rumor control, innovation promo-
tion, vaccine campaign and cooperation on climate change.
Results
Echo chamber phenomena in retweet networks
To explore the formation and evolution of echo chambers in
the real world, we first display the core retweet networks of two
typical polarized events (Fig. 1, see Materials and Methods and
Fig. S1 for data processing details). We find that in both cases,
the clustering results begin to take shape at a very early stage
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and the network segregation remains unchanged as the network
grows. Interestingly, during the 2016 US first presidential de-
bate (Fig. 1A), Twitter users form distinct three clusters, where
red and blue nodes make up two polarized echo chambers while
yellow nodes connect them in the middle. Through analyzing
the top five retweeted twitters in each echo chamber, we con-
firm that all leading twitters in the same cluster show clearly the
same political leaning, i.e., the red nodes represent individuals
who tend to support Donald Trump while blue Hillary Clinton
supporters. Besides, the yellow cluster indicates the existence
of those undecided people who may hold neutral or wavering
opinions. However, a distinctive difference in network struc-
ture emerges in the 2016 US vice-presidential debate (Fig. 1B).
There are very few undecided individuals and the final network
only contains two echo chamber clusters, composed by Mike
Pence supporters and Tim Kaine supporters. They share the
similar degree of network segregations.
Agent-based model of public discourse
In light of the observed echo chamber effects in large-scale
social media, we introduce an agent-based model to describe
the dynamical evolutions of public discourse for a certain event
(see Fig. S2 for model parameters). Consider a networkG with
N users. Usually there will be a multitude of viewpoints (news
contents, identity politics, etc.) spreading simultaneously on
social networks. Without loss of generality, assume there are
two: viewpoint Blue (θ1) and viewpoint Red (θ2). Here θi
characterizes the ideological position and θi ∈ [0, 1]. Define
δ0 = |θ1 − θ2| that characterizes the macroscopic degree of
ideological segregation. Initially, each individual i has its own
belief wi ∈ [0, 1] on this event, which is uniformly distributed.
At each time step T , with probability ΩT , user i receives and
updates with θ1 while with probability 1 − ΩT , i updates with
θ2. Generally, ΩT and 1 − ΩT describe the current campaign
efforts of the group viewpoints among population. The evolu-
tionary processes at time T are as follows:
Randomly choose a node i. We take the case of updating
with θ1: (1) If |wi − θ1| < δ1, where δ1 is the identity scope of
the users which represents their tolerance threshold of social-
cognitive bias (i.e., the scope of identity with which people feel
resonated), i chooses to accept viewpoint Blue and changes its
state from undecided (U ) to viewpoint Blue supporter (SB).
In addition, i receives a positive feedback from the viewpoint
he/she supports according to the Bounded Confidence Model
equation (BCM): w¯i = (1 − µ1)wi + µ1θ1, µ1 ∈ [0, 1] [32].
(2) If |wi − θ1| ≥ δ1, i will not accept the viewpoint or change
its state immediately. Instead, i randomly selects a neighbor
j, representing that the individual is seeking for a further dis-
cussion with a trusted friend. Now consider the belief distance
between i and j: (i) If |wi − wj | < δ1, i enjoys a conversation
of similar ideas and its belief is affected by j’s because of the
homogeneity trend [36]: w¯i = (1−µ2)wi +µ2wj , µ2 ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) If |wi − wj | ≥ δ1, i finds that their belief difference on
this event is so big that he/she simply wants to talk to another
user who holds similar opinion. Hence, i randomly rewires to
another node k which s.t: |wi − wk| < δ1, in correspondence
with the selection bias. In summary, each node in the network
has three possible interactions within one updating round: the
node becomes S state and receives positive feedback from the
viewpoint it supports; the node’s belief is influenced by a cer-
tain neighbor who holds similar opinion; or the node chooses
to rewire (see Fig. S5A for schematic of the modeling frame-
work). When all nodes in the network update once following
this procedure, the dynamical evolution moves to the next time
step T + 1.
The evolutions terminate when the population states of the
system become stable, namely, no more users change their
states or the system reaches to a dynamic equilibrium. The
latter may happen in some oscillating cases where the support-
ers of one viewpoint can be directly absorbed to the other one
due to the large population identity scope (e.g., Fig. 2E). In
this model, we take into account the detailed socio-cognitive
biases that drive individual cognitive process and network pro-
cess: tolerance threshold, confirmation bias and selection bias
(rewiring). In particular, the confirmation bias results in two
collective behaviors: reinforcing the existing belief systems via
campaign influence and converging to the homogeneity clus-
ters that hold similar beliefs via peer influence. Therefore,
we consider confirmation bias as the combined effects of pos-
itive feedback and homogeneity trend, which is controlled by
the rates µ1 and µ2 respectively. In addition, to describe the
concurrent spreading of the two group viewpoints, we use an
asynchronous updating mechanism where only one individual
is randomly picked up to update with either viewpoint Blue or
viewpoint Red at one time.
Fig. 2 shows the emergence of echo chamber phenomena us-
ing this agent-based model. For simplicity and without loss of
generality, we assume the two viewpoints (θ1 = 0.2, θ2 = 0.7)
share the same campaign efforts (ΩT = 0.5) and the popula-
tion holds an intermediate level of confirmation bias (µ1 = 0.5,
µ2 = 0.5). As the population identity scope becomes larger, we
notice that the system evolution experiences three phases (Fig.
2A and B): initially both the cluster size and the internal con-
nections of Red supporters and Blue supporters increase and
the undecided group gradually goes extinct until reaching to
a plateau of polarization, which is finally followed by a non-
trivial state that the proportion of Red and Blue supporters are
both equal to 0.5 along with a sharp increase of edge connec-
tions between them. This indicates that there can be three pos-
sible public opinion formation outcomes, despite the degree of
ideological segregation is unchanged (δ0 = 0.5). The typical
corresponding stable network structures are present in Fig. 2C
to E. The final number of clusters changes from three to one as
δ1 increases. Two critical points can be clearly obtained: one is
at about δ1,1 = 0.19 where the undecided individuals are com-
pletely absorbed by the polarized viewpoints, and the other one
is at about δ1,2 = 0.43 where the two echo chambers begin to
integrate and form one giant cluster. Note that in one cluster
situation (Fig. 2E), different supporters are fully mixed where
the social network polarization is non-existential, and the final
proportions of Blue and Red supporters are actually equal to
the updating probabilities ΩT = 1 − ΩT = 0.5, regardless the
asymmetrical positions of the two viewpoints. In other words,
if the population identity scope exceeds a threshold (δ1,2), peo-
ple would peacefully communicate with each other, leading to
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Figure 2: Modeling emergence of echo chambers. The relationship between degree of ideological segregation and population
identity scope determines structural characters of public discourse results. The proportion evolutions of (A) population states and
(B) different types of edges indicate three possible opinion formation outcomes. The corresponding stable network structures
after 20-30 steps of simulations are present in (C to E), which reproduce the emergence of echo chamber phenomena. Parameters:
campaign effort ΩT = 0.5, position of viewpoint Blue θ1 = 0.2, position of viewpoint Red θ2 = 0.7, positive feedback rate
µ1 = 0.5, homogeneity trend rate µ2 = 0.5. All evolutions begin from an ER graph with (A to B) network size N = 104, the
average degree 〈k〉 = 6. Simulation results are averaged over 100 independent runs. In (C to E), N = 103 and 〈k〉 = 6.
a harmonious social discussion. The complete time evolutions
of these three network topologies can be found in Movie. S1-
S3. In line with the diverse echo chamber structures observed
in Twitter (Fig. 1, Fig. S3), we conclude that it is the relation-
ship between degree of ideological segregation and population
identity scope that plays a main role in shaping structural char-
acters of public opinions on social networks.
Individual cognitive process driven by confirma-
tion bias
We now turn our attention to the impact of population confir-
mation bias, the combined effects of positive feedback and ho-
mogeneity trend, on public discourse (Fig. 3). According to our
model, w¯i = (1−µ1)wi+µ1θv = wi+µ1(θv−wi), v ∈ {1, 2}.
Therefore, the larger µ1 is, the faster the individual belief con-
verges to the group viewpoint, indicating a stronger positive
feedback. Similarly, the larger µ2 is, the stronger homogene-
ity trend the individuals have. Overall, moderate homogene-
ity trend and weak positive feedback promote social discussion
and bring about larger echo chambers with less undecided in-
dividuals (Fig. 3A and B). Of particular interest, we find that
even a small homogeneity trend can significantly reduce the un-
decided population when the positive feedback is weak (see the
phase region where µ1 ∈ [0, 0.3], µ2 ∈ [0, 0.2] in Fig. 3A).
In stark contrast, the positive feedback makes dominant influ-
ence when the feedback is relatively strong. Specifically, swift
positive feedback may increase the opinion distance between
supporters and undecided individuals and accelerate the belief
polarizing process, which hinders sufficient individual cogni-
tive evolution and inhibits the final echo chamber size (Fig. 3C,
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Figure 3: Confirmation bias and attitude evolution. (A
to B) Generally, moderate homogeneity trend and weak posi-
tive feedback lead to larger echo chambers (here a significantly
higher proportion of Red Supporters) with a lower proportion
of Undecided individuals. (C) A strong positive feedback may
increase the belief distance between supporters and undecided
people and accelerate the opinion polarizing process, which
hinders sufficient social discourse and results in the decrease
of final echo chamber size. (D) When positive feedback is
fixed, a moderate homogeneity trend behaves best in promot-
ing social discourse of different opinions, which helps reduce
the undecided population and effectively prevents the forma-
tion of small clusters that hold extreme opinions (also see (F)).
(E to F) Distribution of individual beliefs in steady states, cor-
responding to the various situations in (C) and (D). Parameters:
all evolutions begin from an ER graph with N = 104, 〈k〉 = 6
and ΩT = 0.5, θ1 = 0.2, θ2 = 0.7, population identity scope
δ1 = 0.18. In addition, (C) µ2 = 0.5, (D) µ1 = 0.5. Simula-
tion results are averaged over 100 independent runs.
E and Fig. S4 A-C). Note that the difference of Blue and Red
supporters in proportion growth comes from the “extremists”
group whose initial beliefs are close to 1 (Fig. 3E). When the
positive feedback is fixed, an intermediate homogeneity trend
behaves best in promoting mutual interactions and social dis-
course of different beliefs, which reduces the proportion of un-
decided people and effectively prevents the formation of small
clusters that hold extreme beliefs (Fig. 3D, F and Fig. S4 D-E).
These findings suggest immediate points to establish a better
environment for public discourse from the perspective of in-
dividual cognitive process: one should avoid rapid enhancing
feedbacks from the group viewpoint and neither be too stub-
born nor too easy to change in social discussions.
Winning majority support in public discourse
Further, we explore the external campaign factors that can ma-
neuver public opinion formation under the influence of echo
chambers. Generally, given a particular event, the tolerance
of socio-cognitive biases and the degree of confirmation bias
among a certain population are almost invariant for at least a
short period in real world. Setting aside the difference in cam-
paign efforts (ΩT = 1 − ΩT = 0.5), we find the “attractive-
ness” of campaigning viewpoint can be engineered according
to identity politics and socio-cognitive biases (Fig. 4). More
concretely, there always exists best positions of campaigning
viewpoints, where the camps can choose their identity poli-
tics accordingly to obtain their maximal “attractiveness” among
voters (Fig. 4A-C, under this group of parameters, the best po-
sitions are in the range of [0.2, 0.3] and [0.7, 0.8]). Particularly,
if one of the campaigning viewpoints is defined, the opposite
camp may win majority in public discourse through adjusting
its own campaigning viewpoint, or equally changing the degree
of ideological segregation (Fig. 4D, E). On the other hand, if
the degree of ideological segregation is fixed, most people will
be attracted to one of the supporter clusters when the campaign-
ing viewpoints moves to the middle positions. Our results in-
dicate a grim fact that the public opinions can be deliberately
manipulated due to the pursuit of “attractiveness” of campaign-
ing viewpoints. This could lead to serious social polarization
in many scenarios in addition to campaign for election, such
as other political competitions, conspiracy theories and concur-
rent spreading of fake news and the truth.
We also study the influence of campaign effort on winning
majority support (Fig. 5). To better understand the winning
patterns in all situations, we denote ρ = δ1/δ0 as the rela-
tive attraction of the viewpoints, which naturally characterize
the relative influential scope of the campaigning viewpoints on
“wavering” supporters. Of particular interest, when ρ ≥ 1/2,
the attraction basins of the two viewpoints can cover the whole
ideological segregation, leading to a fierce fight for winning
“wavering” supporters and giving rise to the thorough network
polarization in steady state. The polarization threshold of ρ is
actually smaller than 1/2 in our model (e.g., the threshold is
ρ = δ1,1/δ0 = 0.38 in Fig. 2), owing to the impacts of confir-
mation bias and selection bias. Interestingly, the winning deter-
minant gradually changes from the “attractiveness” advantage
of campaigning viewpoint (purely caused by the viewpoint po-
sition) to the campaign effort as the relative attraction of the
viewpoints increases. Specifically, when ρ is relatively small,
the campaign effort completely loses its power in a wide param-
eter range (Fig. 5A, B). However, when ρ becomes large, even
a small advantage in campaign effort can reverse the competing
results (Fig. 5E). The situation of a middling relative attraction
raises an unusual phenomenon where viewpoint Red takes both
“attractiveness” advantage and campaign effort advantage (at
about ΩT ∈ [0.08, 0.36]), it still loses the competition against
viewpoint Blue (Fig. 5C). This may caused by the reason that
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Figure 4: “Attractiveness” of campaigning viewpoint can be engineered according to identity politics and socio-cognitive
biases. Given a particular event, the population identity scope, namely the tolerance of socio-cognitive biases and the degree of
confirmation bias in a certain group of individuals will hardly change for at least a short period. Therefore we fix δ1 = 0.18,
µ1 = µ2 = 0.5 . (A to C) show that the camps can always gain their maximal “attractiveness” of campaigning viewpoint in
public discourse through finding the best positions of the identity politics (here in the range of [0.2, 0.3] and [0.7, 0.8]). Specially,
when one of the viewpoints is settled: (D) θ1 = 0.2 and (E) θ2 = 0.7, the other one can adjust its position (equally the degree
of ideological segregation) in order to occupy majority in public discourse. (F) When the degree of ideological segregation is
settled (δ0 = 0.4), the size of echo chambers reaches to maximum when the positions of the two viewpoints move to the middle,
which are also the same places where the degree of social polarization reaches to its peak. Other parameters: all evolutions begin
form an ER graph with N = 104, 〈k〉 = 6 and ΩT = 0.5. Simulation results are averaged over 100 independent runs.
a strong campaign effort advantage helps attract a fraction of
“wavering” supporters, but meanwhile swiftly widens the belief
gap between Red supporters and the other “wavering” support-
ers owing to the positive feedback effect. Consequently, more
“wavering” supporters gradually converge to viewpoint Blue in
the end. In addition, we find too much or too little campaign
effort all gives rise to a sharp increase of “ignorance” people,
where a local echo chamber already formed before a large frac-
tion of individuals could be informed of the event discussion.
This exhibits that an extremely strong campaign effort blocks
the prompt participation of the global population, which greatly
debilitates the benefits of public discourse and does harm to the
social concern.
Taken together, our results indicates the feasibility of ma-
nipulating public opinions to win majority support in public
discourse, which is not only decided by relative campaign ef-
fort, but also more subtly by the “attractiveness” advantage of
campaigning viewpoints.
Model-data integration of opinion evolution pro-
cesses in 2016 US presidential election
Finally, we investigate the public opinion evolutions in the 2016
US presidential election via model-data integration (Fig. 6). As
the campaign unfolds, the network polarization increases along
with the the rise of echo chambers that absorbs undecided vot-
ers into either camp, as shown by the retweet networks of the
first, second, and third presidential debate (Fig. 6A). More-
over, the attitude evolutions of the same Twitter users during the
first to second and second to third debate are extracted respec-
tively, which provides additional individual-level understand-
ing (Fig. 6B). Most Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton support-
ers are “loyal followers” who would “ignore” the external cam-
paigning voices and hold their political tendencies all the time.
The undecided individuals show no clear tendencies from the
first to second debate, while a majority of them swing to Don-
ald Trump camp from the second to third debate. This suggests
that the final decision of undecided voters are greatly influenced
by the news, debates and political events happened during the
election.
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Figure 5: Impact of campaign effort on winning ma-
jority support. (A to E) As the relative attraction of
the viewpoints in campaign competition increases (ρ =
0.257, 0.3, 0.36, 0.56, 0.76, respectively), the winning determi-
nant changes from the “attractiveness” advantage of campaign-
ing viewpoint to the campaign effort. In addition, too much or
too little campaign effort all leads to a sharp increase of “ig-
norance” people. Parameters: all evolutions begin form an ER
graph with N = 104, 〈k〉 = 6 and µ1 = µ2 = 0.5. Simulation
results are averaged over 100 independent runs.
Fig. 6C further reproduces the whole public discourse evolu-
tions in the 2016 US presidential election by agent-based model
simulations. Here we keep the assumption that the two cam-
paigning viewpoints (θ1, θ2) as well as the population identity
scope (δ1) are unchanged for the given event (the presidential
election). Simulations start from an ER graph with N = 104
and 〈k〉 = 4.5 which is close to the Twitter data. For simplicity
and without loss of generality, we set a moderate level of pop-
ulation confirmation bias (µ1 = µ2 = 0.5). We find a group
of best fitting parameters θ1 = 0.32, θ2 = 0.7, δ1 = 0.32,
Ω1 = Ω2 = 0.5, Ω3 = 0.8, Ω4 = 0.4, Ω5 = 0.1 using
least squares minimization with simulated annealing algorithm
(see Materials and Methods). One more step of the evolution
is shown by simply letting Ω6 = Ω5 = 0.1. Each time step in
our model corresponds to about 10 days in real world, which
is the approximate time interval of the adjacent datasets. As
obtained in the figure, the results of 2 to 5 steps in dynamical
simulations are in good agreement with the real opinion forma-
tion processes, which proves that our agent-based model has
predictive and generative power in real world.
This model-data integration reveals the combined effects of
absorbing wavering undecided individuals and increasing cam-
paign effort on the unprecedented rise and fall of support rates
to respective presidential candidates, which provides great in-
sights into the 2016 US presidential election: the real-time
campaign efforts are directly characterized by model parameter
ΩT , which is also in line with the political advertisement spend-
ing during the election. Hillary Clinton spends 768 million
dollars in total and takes the initial campaign effort advantage
(Ω3 = 0.8) over Donald Trump (398 million dollars). However,
Donald Trump outspends Hillary Clinton by 400% (83.5 mil-
lion dollars vs. 20.2 million dollars) on digital medias, which
may result in the subsequent reversal (Ω4 = 0.4, Ω5 = 0.1) on
social networks [37]. Furthermore, albeit the “attractiveness”
advantage lies on Hillary Clinton’s side (θ1 = 0.32, θ2 = 0.7),
the voters’ tolerance of socio-cognitive bias is so large that the
undecided voters can be substantially affected by the campaign
efforts, which may seal the fate of the final election outcome.
Moreover, we notice that there exists a small fraction of indi-
viduals who may switch their sides to the opposite camps dur-
ing the election (Fig. 6B). Here we provide intuitive illustra-
tions of sides switching (from Blue supporter to Red supporter)
mechanisms in model evolutions (Fig. 6D). Two detailed exam-
ples are shown: (1) if a Blue supporter holds a belief in purple
region that can be directly absorbed by either camp, with prob-
ability 1 − ΩT , it updates with viewpoint Red and switches its
side in one time step; (2) if a Blue supporter updates with view-
point Red in two consecutive steps, first it may interact with one
of its connected neighbors who is a Red supporter and change
its belief according to the homogeneity trend. Subsequently, it
also becomes a Red supporter.
Discussion
A large amount of empirical studies based on big data from
large-scale social networks have provided valuable insights into
the widespread existence of echo chamber phenomena. How-
ever, the underlying dynamical processes that give rise to such
collective evolutions remain unclear. The complex nonlinear
interactions between human behaviors and social systems like
online social networks make it extremely hard to understand or
predict the formation of public opinions. In this article, through
network structural and quantitative analysis of Twitter events
and agent-based modeling, we investigate the public discourse
and social network echo chambers driven by socio-cognitive
biases.
Looking at the different clustering results of echo cham-
ber evolutions in polarizing retweet networks of two politi-
cal events, we propose an agent-based dynamical model that
clearly and distinctly characterizes the individual cognitive pro-
cess. The modeling emergence of diverse echo chambers indi-
cates that the scope of identity with which people feel resonated
rules the final structural characters of public opinion forma-
tion. We then examine the detailed impacts of selection bias
(characterized by network rewiring mechanism) and confirma-
tion bias (the combined effects of positive feedback from the
7
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Figure 6: Model-data integration provides insights into the 2016 US presidential election. (A) Retweet networks of the first,
second, and third presidential debate in 2016 US presidential election show the rise of echo chambers that absorbs undecided
voters into either camp with increasing network polarization. (B) Sankey diagram of individual-level opinion evolutions of the
same Twitter users during the first to second, and the second to third debate, respectively. Most Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton
supporters are “loyal followers who would not change their political tendency from beginning to end. (C) Reproduce opinion
evolution processes in 2016 US presidential election by agent-based model. We take the poll data on September 15, 2016 given
by RealClearPolics website as an initial distribution of supporting rate before debate, while from the first to third debate, we
use the same Twitter data as in (A). Fixing a middle level of confirmation bias (µ1 = µ2 = 0.5), we find a group of best fitting
parameters θ1 = 0.32, θ2 = 0.7, δ1 = 0.32, Ω1 = Ω2 = 0.5, Ω3 = 0.8, Ω4 = 0.4, Ω5 = 0.1. We simply let Ω6 = Ω5 = 0.1 and
plot one more step of the evolution. The results of 2 to 5 steps in dynamical simulations are in good agreement with real data, the
details of which are present in the table. Each simulation result on the figure is the average of 100 replications. (D) Illustration
of sides switching (from Blue supporter to Red supporter) mechanisms in model evolutions. Shown are the two possible ways:
(1) switch via one single update; (2) switch via multiple updates. The belief changes are calculated and marked according to the
model.
group viewpoint the user supports and the homogeneity trend
which describes the degree of peer influence) on individual be-
lief evolutions and public opinion formation. A strong positive
feedback acts as a roadblock for pubic discourse, which accel-
erates the belief polarizing process and raises the proportion of
undecided people. On the contrary, a moderate homogeneity
trend promotes the sufficient communications of different be-
liefs and substantially prevents the emergence of “extremists”
group. Our results suggest possible solutions for contributing
a better social discourse environment from the individual per-
spective: be more inclusive and open, be alert of the rapid self-
reinforcement from the campaign viewpoints that are coherent
with your own opinions, and avoid being either immutable or
easily changeable in social discussions.
Further, we find that winning majority support in public dis-
course is determined not solely by whose voice is louder (rela-
tive campaign effort) but also more subtly by the divergence of
ideological positioning between opposing campaigns (the “at-
tractiveness advantage of campaigning viewpoint). The com-
peting camps can always find the optimal viewpoint positions
to gain their maximal “attractiveness among voters according
to identity politics and socio-cognitive biases, which may bring
about serious tragedies of social polarization in many scenar-
ios, such as political opposition, opinion conflicts caused by
conspiracy theories, and the spreading of unsubstantiated ru-
mors [29]. As the relative attraction of the viewpoints in cam-
paign competition increases, the winning determinant gradu-
ally changes from the “attractiveness advantage to the cam-
paign effort. Of particular interest, even a small advantage in
campaign effort can reverse the competing results if the relative
attraction of the viewpoints is large enough. It’s also notewor-
thy that too much or too little campaign effort would signifi-
cantly inhibit the public discourse and lead to a sharp increase
of uninformed “ignorance” individuals.
Finally, our mechanistic model simulations that well repro-
duce the entire opinion evolution processes during the 2016 US
presidential election show the combined effects of absorbing
wavering undecided individuals and increasing campaign ef-
fort on the unprecedented rise and fall of support rates to re-
spective presidential candidates. Although most supporters of
either camp would hardly change their political tendency, the fi-
nal decision of many wavering voters are greatly influenced by
the campaign efforts. The “attractiveness” advantage of cam-
paigning viewpoint that Hillary Clinton camp holds is offset
and even reversed by the large campaign efforts advantage of
Donald Trump camp on social medias, which is in line with the
political advertisement spending situation during the election.
The politically motivated social division has aroused great
concern since the 2016 US presidential election [9, 38, 39].
More seriously, the ceaseless spreading of fake news on social
networks threatens the foundation of well-functioning democ-
racy and often disturbs people’s daily life [40, 41, 42]. Back
to the questions we raised at the beginning: are there effective
ways to deal with these social rifts caused by echo chamber ef-
fects? In addition to the individual perspective solutions men-
tioned above, our results also suggest that instead of directly
providing the opposite viewpoint which may lead to strong
resistance (rewire), we should build bridges within people’s
identity scope and gradually promote the mutual understand-
ing of different camps and different cultures. For the campaign
against rumors, the truth news should both be well-designed
for a best ideological position and occupy a proper advantage
of campaign effort such that they could attract more support-
ers and meanwhile promotes social discussion. A possible way
is to let the truth be posted, forwarded or supported by those
super-spreaders on social networks and the high-impact medias
once the rumor occurs and spreads. Finally, the initial distribu-
tion of population beliefs as well as the population tolerance
of socio-cognitive bias could be shaped through publicity and
education, which is of vital importance in the long term.
Our findings reveal the underlying individual cognitive and
network evolution processes on large-scale social networks
driven by socio-cognitive biases, which not only helps under-
stand how echo chambers make influence on public opinion for-
mation, but also sheds lights onto social media campaigns and
public discourse that can unite us for desired social changes in
order to address many urgent social and political issues ranging
from climate inaction to vaccine refusals.
While we try to provide a general framework in this work,
the parameters are restrained to homogeneous conditions. The
identity scopes and the homogeneity trends of individuals can
be various in real world. The initial population beliefs may
submit to Gaussian distribution or biased distribution such as
heavy-tailed. The evolutions of public discourse incorporating
these heterogeneous characters may worth further explorations.
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Materials and Methods
Twitter data processing
All original Twitter datasets are publicly available at
https://www.docnow.io/catalog. The raw twitter data are not
allowed to be shared online according to Twitter’s terms of ser-
vice, therefore all the datasets are Twitter IDs. We first down-
load the tweets using Twitter’s API and obtain user ID (nodes),
retweeting relationship (edges) and the timestamp from each
tweet. Restrained by the the computing capabilities for using
layout algorithm Force Atlas 2 in Gephi, we make random sam-
pling and get 10-20% data of the original datasets for the first,
second and third debate. Then we extract the maximal con-
nected branch which occupies over 90% nodes to exclude the
interference of small clusters. Define the weight of each node
as the total number of being retweeted. To explicitly reflect the
core structural characters in opinion evolutions without losing
any information, we record all nodes’ weights and get rid of
those “pure followers” who are not being retweeted (in-degree
equals to 0) and only retweet others once (out-degree equals
to 1), leading to a simplified retweet network with weighted
nodes (Fig. S1). This simplification takes out about half edges
and allows preciser community analysis. The final information
of retweet networks in Fig. 6A are as follows: the first de-
bate includes 54840 edges and 25375 nodes, the second debate
includes 81055 edges and 33995 nodes and the third debate in-
cludes 58354 edges and 26219 nodes. Finally, the weighted
supporter number for each camp (or the supporter strength ob-
served on social networks) can be approximately calculated
by simply summing up the weight of all nodes within each
echo chamber. The sampled datasets we used in this paper
and the data processing codes using Python 3 environment can
be obtained at https://github.com/fufeng/Public-discourse-and-
social-network-echo-chambers.
All the network figures in this paper use the same layout al-
gorithm Force Atlas 2 in Gephi [43]. The color label of each
node is also calculated by the same community detection algo-
rithm Louvain Method [44].
We stress that our main efforts is to understand the public
opinion evolutions through individual cognitive process driven
by socio-cognitive biases (i.e., the agent-based modeling). A
small fluctuation of supporter proportions that caused by the
random sampling and the community detection algorithm is un-
avoidable yet tolerable, especially for the reason that we can
always find a group of best fitting parameters in our model.
Data fitting method
Given a particular controversial event like 2016 US presidential
election case in our work, we assume that the inherent proper-
ties of the online users (i.e., the identity scope and the degree
of confirmation bias effects) would rarely change in the entire
opinion evolution processes once the two polarized group view-
points are settled. Therefore, we aim to find a fixed group of θ1,
θ2, δ1, µ1, µ2 with a changing group of ΩT that can best mimic
the real evolutions. The simulation results of four successive
time steps (from T = 2 to T = 5) are expected to reproduce the
real data. To reduce the computational complexity and without
loss of generality, we fix a moderate degree of confirmation
bias and set µ1 = µ2 = 0.5. The range of other parameters
are as follows: θ1 ∈ [0, 0.5], θ2 ∈ [0.5, 1], δ1 ∈ [0, θ2 − θ1],
and ΩT ∈ [0, 1], T ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The step length for θ1, θ2
and δ1 is 0.02 while the step length for ΩT is 0.1. We take the
average value of 100 times simulations as the final results for
each group of parameters.
We develop a simple simulated annealing (SA) algorithm
with least squares minimization to find the best fit of real data,
which is as follows:
1. Initialization and definitions. Define S =
{θ1, θ2, µ1,ΩT } as the set of all possible combinations of pa-
rameters. According the descriptions of parameter range and
step length above, S is a finite set. Denote R as the vector
of real data, which is eight-dimensional here (the proportions
of supporters for two candidates before debate and during the
first, second and third debate). Initially, the iteration counter
i = 0 and an initial state is set S0 ∈ S. In addition, we se-
lect a starting temperature T0 and a freezing threshold Tmin
with a cooling rate r. At time step i, Si is the current state and
Ti is the cooling schedule. Based on the least squares mini-
mization, we define the cost function f(Si) = 1N · ‖Aver−R‖
2
σ2 ,
where N = 8 is the dimension of R, Aver is the average result
(also a eight-dimensional vector) of 100 simulations for state
Si, ‖Aver − R‖ is the Euclidean distance of vector Aver and
R, and σ = 1% is a precision control coefficient for the global
fitting.
2. The SA methods. For time step i + 1, a new state S¯ is
randomly generated from S − {Si}, and the Markov chain of
the state vector Si is determined by the followings:
Algorithm 1: Simulated Annealing
while Ti > Tmin ∧ f(Si) ≥ 1 do
if f(S¯) ≤ f(Si) then
Si+1 = S¯;
else
Si+1 = S¯ with probability
exp
[
(f(Si)− f(S¯))/Ti
]
;
Si+1 = Si otherwise.
end
Ti+1 = r ∗ Ti
end
The algorithm allows prior information and can be recy-
cled by setting S0 as the best group of parameters that we
have already found. The C++ code for this simulated an-
nealing algorithm along with our dynamical model is avail-
able at https://github.com/fufeng/Public-discourse-and-social-
network-echo-chambers.
Supplementary Materials
Supplementary Text
Figs. S1-S9
Movies S1-S3: time evolutions of the three network topologies
shown in Fig. 2C-E.
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Introduction of an agent-based dynamical model without belief inter-
action mechanism between neighbors (Model 2)
Here we present a different dynamical model without belief interaction mechanism between neighbors.
Consider a network G with N nodes. Given a certain controversial event, assume there are two simultane-
ously spreading group viewpoints: viewpoint Blue (θ1) and viewpoint Red (θ2), where θ1, θ2 ∈ [0, 1]. Each
individual i has its initial belief wi ∈ [0, 1] on this event, which is uniformly distributed. At a certain step
T , the detailed evolutions processes are as follows:
Randomly choose a node i. With probability ΩT , i receives and updates with θ1 while with probability
1 − ΩT , i updates with θ2. We still take the updating of θ1 for example: (1) If |wi − θ1| < δ1, where δ1
represents the population identity scope, or the population tolerance threshold of social-cognitive bias. Then
node i accepts the viewpoint Blue and changes its state from undecided (U ) to viewpoint Blue supporter
(SB). Additionally, i receives a positive feedback: w¯i = (1−µ1)wi+µ1θ1, µ1 ∈ [0, 1]. (2) If |wi − θ1| ≥ δ1,
however, i will not make a decision on whether to accept the viewpoint or change its state immediately.
Instead, i randomly selects a neighbor j and conducts a further discussion with its friend. Consider the belief
distance between i and j: (i) If |wi − wj| < δ1, different from the dynamical model in the main text where
i’s belief converges to j’s because of the homogeneity trend, here we further consider the belief distance
between neighbor j and viewpoint Blue: (a) If |wj − θ1| < δ1, which means j supports the viewpoint Blue.
Then j may try to persuade i to become a Blue supporter as well. Consequently i’s opinion is influenced
to some extent and wi comes closer to θ1: w¯i = (1 − µ1)wi + µ1θ1. (b) If |wj − θ1| ≥ δ1, i is happy to
find that they hold similar opinions on this viewpoint and he/she simply does not make any change. (ii) If
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
03
91
5v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  1
0 F
eb
 20
20
|wi − wj| ≥ δ1, i randomly rewires to another node k which s.t: |wi − wk| < δ1. To sum up, now each node
has four possible interactions within one updating round: the node becomes S state and receives positive
feedback from the viewpoint it supports; the node is advised by a friend who supports the viewpoint and
its belief becomes closer to that viewpoint; the node finds that it holds similar opinions with its friend and
does not make any change; or the node chooses to rewire (see schematic in Fig. S5B). The evolution moves
to the next time step T + 1 when all notes update once.
The dynamical processes stop when the system becomes steady. As can be seen in Fig. S5, the main dif-
ference of this new model lies in the absence of belief interactions between neighbors, i.e., the homogeneity
trend effect. Under this circumstance, the evolution direction is deterministic: when updates with viewpoint
θv, v ∈ {1, 2}, the users’ beliefs are either converging to θv or unchanged. However, when affected by the
homogeneity trend, the opinion evolution direction becomes stochastic, depending on the relative belief
position of the neighbors.
Overall, we observe similar phenomena using Model 2 with regard to the following perspectives: (1)
the three phases of modeling emergence of echo chambers (Fig. S6); (2) “attractiveness” of campaigning
viewpoint can be manipulated according to identity politics and socio-cognitive biases (Fig. S8); (3) too
much or too little campaign effort all leads to a sharp increase of “ignorance” people, and the winning
determinant changes from the “attractiveness” advantage of campaigning viewpoint to the campaign effort
as the relative attraction of the viewpoints in campaign competition increases (Fig. S9).
Of particular interests are the different dynamical results between these two models. First and most
importantly, the extra “extremist clusters are more likely to form in which the individuals hold extreme
beliefs and will rarely change according to the new evolution mechanisms (Fig. S6C and F). This suggests
substantial importance of homogeneity trend described by µ2 in the main text which effectively promotes
the sufficient social interactions that could help prevent the formation of “extremist clusters. Second, the
confirmation bias solely described by µ1 leads to non-monotonic attitude evolutions (Fig. S7). Note that
µ1 actually describes two impacts: the positive feedback from the viewpoint that user supports, and the
convergence rate to the viewpoint the user updates with. When µ1 is close to 0, both effects are too weak
to make significant influence. A moderate or relatively small µ1 weakens the influence of positive feedback
and the converging processes enlarge the echo chambers. Yet when µ1 becomes large, the positive feedback
2
effect dominants the evolution which hinders the sufficient social discussion. Finally, we also notice that
the simulation results of Model 2 are much smoother in all subfigures, which is caused by the lacking of
stochastic processes in the dynamical evolutions.
In conclusion, our results reveal that the main text model with homogeneity trend which allows stochas-
tic evolutions performs better in preventing the clustering of extremists, and the corresponding structural
character is closer to the 2016 US presidential election case. However, Model 2 also successfully describes
the echo chamber effects with less model parameters and higher simulation stability. Therefore, we believe
that this agent-based dynamical model without belief interaction mechanism between neighbors may pave
ways for understanding many other situations in real world, such as the evolutions of extremists and the im-
pacts of “inactive” nodes whose ideas are rarely affected by medias on social networks. The modifications
based on this framework also worth further explorations.
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Figure S1: Data processing method of retweet networks. Define the weight of each node as the total
number of being retweeted. On the maximal connected branch, we get rid of those “pure followers” who
are not being retweeted (in-degree equals to 0) and only retweet others once (out-degree equals to 1) and
plot the remaining retweet network with all nodes’ weights recorded. The simplified retweet network has
all the important information and can better illustrate the core structural characters.
4
Figure S2: List of model parameters. Shown are the model variables and their descriptions.
5
Figure S3: Retweet network evolution of Twitter hashtag #MarchForScience. For comparison, we
provide the existence of real-world event that shows clearly one giant cluster structure.
6
Figure S4: Time evolution of individual beliefs under different degree of confirmation bias. (A
to C) Strong positive feedbacks accelerate the opinion polarizing process and lead to insufficient social
discourse where more undecided individuals exist. (D to F) An intermediate homogeneity trend significantly
promotes the interactions of different beliefs, which reduces the undecided people and effectively prevents
the formation of small clusters that hold extreme beliefs. Parameters: all evolutions begin from an ER graph
with N = 104, 〈k〉 = 6 and ΩT = 0.5, θ1 = 0.2, θ2 = 0.7, δ1 = 0.18.
7
Figure S5: Schematic of the two model frameworks. (A) Framework of the agent-based dynamical
model in the main text. (B) Framework of the new dynamical evolution model (Model 2) without the
effects of homogeneity trend, i.e., there are no belief interactions between neighbors.
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Figure S6: Modeling emergence of echo chambers and individual belief evolutions in Model 2. The
proportion evolutions of (A) population states and (B) different types of edges indicate three possible opin-
ion formation outcomes. The corresponding stable network structures and individual belief evolutions are
present in (C to E) and (F to H), respectively. Of particular interest, the “extremist” clusters are more likely
to form and their beliefs will rarely change during the whole evolution processes (C and F). Parameters:
ΩT = 0.5, θ1 = 0.2, θ2 = 0.7, µ1 = 0.5. All evolutions begin from an ER graph with (A to B) N = 104,
〈k〉 = 6. Simulation results are averaged over 100 independent runs. In (C to H), N = 103 and 〈k〉 = 6.
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Figure S7: Confirmation bias and attitude evolution in Model 2. We show how confirmation bias
without homogeneity trend, which is described by solely µ1, influences the final opinion formation results.
All evolution begins from an ER graph with N = 104 with 〈k〉 = 6. Simulation results are averaged over
100 independent runs. Parameters: ΩT = 0.5, θ1 = 0.2, θ2 = 0.7. (A) δ1 = 0.16, (B) δ1 = 0.2.
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Figure S8: “Attractiveness” of campaigning viewpoint can be manipulated according to identity
politics and socio-cognitive biases (Model 2). All evolutions begin from an ER graph with N = 104 with
〈k〉 = 6. Simulation results are averaged over 100 independent runs. Parameters: ΩT = 0.5, µ1 = 0.5,
δ1 = 0.18. (D) θ1 = 0.2; (E) θ2 = 0.7; (F) δ0 = 0.4.
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Figure S9: Impact of campaign effort on winning majority support in Model 2. Parameters: all
evolutions begin form an ER graph with N = 104, 〈k〉 = 6 and µ1 = 0.5. Simulation results are averaged
over 100 independent runs. Relative attraction of campaign viewpoints: (A) ρ = 0.257, (B) ρ = 0.36, (C)
ρ = 0.76.
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